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THE CO-EVOLUTION OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE:  COOPERATION, THEN
COMPETITION, THEN CONFLICT
J. B. RUHL*
INTRODUCTION
Among the fields of law, the evolution of environmental law
stands out as fast-paced and tumultuous, experiencing dramatic
changes of emphasis in what would be lightening-quick time frames
for many other areas of legal practice.  I had the pleasure of covering
two rapidly emerging themes of environmental law’s evolution in an
earlier issue of this journal.  I traced the histories of sustainable de-
velopment1 and environmental justice2, and concluded that each was
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, Carbondale, Illinois, and
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Washington, D.C.  Please direct questions or comments to jruhl@main.nlc.gwu.edu.  I apolo-
gize up front for repeated references to other works I have authored on the topics of complex-
ity theory, the Endangered Species Act, and sustainable development.  It is not an exercise in
self-promotion.  Rather, the occasion to write this article prompted me to synthesize several
themes appearing in these other works, and I offer the citations merely for anyone interested in
further background on the topics covered.  This article may be accessed via the World-Wide
Web at <http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/9DELPFRuhl>.
1. My working definition of sustainable development is “development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”  WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).  At its broad-
est, sustainable development is the philosophy that today’s progress must not come at tomor-
row’s expense and that human progress thus must be sustained not just in a few places for a few
years, but for the entire planet into the distant future.  See Jonathan Lash, Toward a Sustain-
able Future, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 83, 83 (1997).  Only recently have policy makers
and commentators begun to hash out the legal framework for implementing sustainable devel-
opment as a principle of governance rather than merely one of philosophy.  See John C. Dern-
bach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1, 85-90 (1998).  For thorough bibliographies of sustainable development literature, see
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURES: A CRITICAL GUIDE TO RECENT
BOOKS, REPORTS, AND PERIODICALS (Michael Marien ed., 1996); Keith Pezzoli, Sustainable
Development Literature: A Transdisciplinary Bibliography, 40 J. ENVTL. PLANNING & MGMT.
575 (1997).
2. My working definition of environmental justice is the “fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to
the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies.”  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Federal Activities, Final Guidance
for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA’s NEPA Compliance Analyses
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on the brink of moving into the advanced stage of evolution at which
there is “hard law” to apply the policies to real-world situations.3  My
main objective was to demonstrate how new policy ideas evolve into
real-world law, and sustainable development and environmental jus-
tice provide currently unfolding examples following strikingly similar
pathways of development.  In that exposition, however, the manner
in which I treated the two concepts made it appear as though they
had evolved and would continue to evolve on parallel, but largely in-
dependent, paths toward relevance in the hard law sense.  Only in
passing did I suggest that “[i]t is quite possible … that the law of sus-
tainable development will eventually catch up with and then subsume
the law of environmental justice, as social equity is the important
third leg of sustainable development policy.”4
The occasion of this symposium issue has led me to consider
more deliberately the connection between sustainable development
and environmental justice.  Clearly, sustainable development and en-
vironmental justice, whatever they mean today and wherever they
are heading, have not evolved and are not evolving in separate bub-
bles.  But how are they related?  Are they mutually reinforcing de-
velopments, and if so, are they exclusively so?  Or is there the poten-
tial for tension between the two policies as they develop into legal
doctrines?  Does the fact that many proponents of sustainable devel-
opment support the environmental justice movement, and vice versa,
mean that they always will?
These are questions about the co-evolution of sustainable devel-
opment and environmental justice, rather than simply the evolution
of each separately.  Not all emerging legal policies necessarily co-
evolve in readily discernable patterns; for example, it may be difficult
                                                                                                                                     
(visited Oct. 19, 1998) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ofa/ejepa.html>(explaining how EPA will in-
clude environmental justice factors in environmental impact statements).  The topic of envi-
ronmental justice, and whether environmental injustice truly exists, has exploded in the last
decade into legal and social commentary.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE
PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1998); DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVI-
RONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1996); KENNETH A. MANASTER, EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995); Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994); Symposium, Race, Class, and Environmental Justice, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992).  For thorough bibliographies of environmental justice literature, see
Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997); Adam D.
Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,543 (1995).
3. See J. B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance: Why Should Real-World Environ-
mental Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable Development Policy?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 273 (1998).
4. Id. at 291 n.52.  The other two legs are economy and environment.  See id. at 278.
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to find any co-evolutionary links between emerging policies in sports
law and environmental justice law.  However, even on a superficial
level, sustainable development and environmental justice seem in-
exorably linked by common themes of environmental quality and so-
cial equity.  Yet sustainable development clearly is larger than envi-
ronmental justice in terms of the scope of policies, stakeholders, and
complexities involved, and environmental justice clearly is focused on
its more narrow agenda with an intensity not found in sustainable de-
velopment. The two policies do not overlap completely in terms of
either scope or focus.  They are not interchangeable.
Hence, while my prior analysis of the two emerging policies fo-
cused on their similarities in terms of evolution from policy to hard
law, it strikes me on reflection that the really interesting questions
focus on their differences.  To emphasize the co-evolutionary nature
of the two policies and how their differences influence that process, I
borrow from principles of evolution developed in the more technical
fields of biological evolution and complexity theory.5  Although these
principles apply to some extent only metaphorically—law, after all, is
not a biological organism—in many ways law evolves through forces
quite familiar to evolutionary analysis applied in other disciplines.6
Law is a complex adaptive system in the truest sense of the term.7
5. Complexity theory refers to the body of literature and research devoted to “the study
of the behavior of macroscopic collections of [interacting] units that are endowed with the po-
tential to evolve in time.”  PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COM-
PLEXITY 7 (1995).  Although the study of such complex adaptive systems can be quite technical
in substance, many of the recent and most influential works in the field focus on applications of
the technical theory to real world phenomena, such as biological evolution.  See, e.g., MURRAY
GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR (1994); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE
UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY (1995); JOHN
L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING THE PARADOXICAL WORLD THROUGH THE
SCIENCE OF SURPRISE (1994); JACK COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS
(1994); BRIAN GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMPLEXITY (1994); JOHN HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER (1998).  For
histories of the development of complexity theory and the important role the Santa Fe Institute
has played in complex systems research, see ROGER LEWIN, COMPLEXITY: LIFE AT THE EDGE
OF CHAOS 8-22 (1992); M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY (1992); JAMES GLEICK,
CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 3-8 (1987).  Current information about the field is best ob-
tained from the journal Complexity.
6. For an overview of evolutionary theories of law, with a special emphasis on the appli-
cation of complexity theory, see J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to
Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 1407 (1996).
7. For a general description of the behavior of legal systems using concepts from com-
plexity theory, see J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State,
45 DUKE L. J. 849 (1996).
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Thus, sustainable development and environmental justice can be ex-
pected to exhibit co-evolutionary patterns and relations that can be
explained by using concepts being developed through complex sys-
tems research.8
Part I of this Essay outlines the most important complex systems
concepts for purposes of analyzing the sustainable develop-
ment/environmental justice co-evolutionary system.  Co-evolutionary
systems exhibit basic behaviors such as cooperation, competition, and
conflict as strategies for coping with complex positive and negative
feedback effects between systems.  Because what one system does af-
fects both the others and itself, the success of any participant in a co-
evolutionary system depends in large part on the adaptability of its
“design”—how it is set up to respond to “moves” by its co-
evolutionary kin.  When legal policies co-evolve, each vying for
prominence, legitimacy, support, and other real-world indicia of legal
significance, they undoubtedly execute and respond to the basic co-
evolutionary strategies of cooperation, competition, and conflict.
Part II of the Essay grounds that theme of legal policy co-
evolution in the practical context of sustainable development and en-
vironmental justice.  To begin that discussion, I use an example from
the recent past to illustrate how a similarly-situated pair of environ-
mental policies have co-evolved.  The modern environmental move-
ment in the United States emerged in the 1970s under a broad um-
brella of environmentalism,9 which replaced resourcism10 as the
8. For some thoughts on how the development of environmental policy generally be-
haves and evolves as a complex adaptive system, see J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment By Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997).
9. Environmentalism is increasingly hard to define in a way that distinguishes those who
believe in it as a policy versus those who do not.  Public opinion polls show that Americans who
say they care about the environment have grown in number steadily through 1991, to over 60%
of the population, and have plateaued at a level at which environmentalism can be considered
“mainstream.”  Nevertheless, only a small fraction of those “environmentalists” actively make
environmentalism their way of life through dedicated recycling, composting, water conserva-
tion, xeriscape, and so on.  See, e.g., Tibbett L. Speer, Growing the Green Market, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, Aug. 1997, at 45; Peter Stisser, A Deeper Shade of Green, AM. DEMO-
GRAPHICS, Mar. 1994, at 24.  See also Traci Watson, For Most Americans, It’s not Easy Being
Green, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 1998, at 3A.  Perhaps the best way of defining environmentalism,
therefore, is by process of elimination: i.e., it is neither utilitarian-oriented resourcism, see infra
note 10, nor biocentric-oriented Deep Ecology, see infra note 11, but rather something in be-
tween—what I will call mainstream environmentalism.
10. I use the term resourcism as a shorthand for the policy position that advocates reliance
on free-market forces, well-defined property rights, and cost-benefit analysis as the principal
mechanism for directing resource consumption and environmental protection policies, based on
the theory that resource owners will be driven by the profit motive to balance resource exploi-
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dominant theme of environmental policy.  An important component
of environmentalism as it emerged out of the euphoria of the first
Earth Day was the Deep Ecology movement - an ardent, ideological,
fervent, yet ultimately small movement of deeply committed preser-
vationists whose intensity fueled the early advancement of environ-
mentalism.11  Over time, however, the cooperation between environ-
mentalism and Deep Ecology waned, yielding eventually to
competition and then—the current state of affairs—to open conflict.
Deep Ecology helped environmentalism get off the ground, ener-
gized its early victories, and then was left in the dust.  Today, main-
stream environmentalism has little tolerance for the extremism of
Deep Ecology.
After that retrospective case study, Part II of the Essay turns at-
tention to the future of co-evolution between environmental justice
and sustainable development.  My working thesis is that environ-
mental justice is to sustainable development what Deep Ecology was
to mainstream environmentalism.  Sustainable development policy
feeds off of the intensely focused rhetoric of environmental justice,
incorporating equity concerns as a key leg of sustainable develop-
ment’s environment-economy-equity policy triad.  But this coopera-
tion will not last.  Environmental justice, as a discrete policy agenda,
is simply too narrow, too ideological, and too unyielding to survive
intact in the more adaptive sustainable development agenda.  As en-
vironmentalism did relative to Deep Ecology, sustainable develop-
                                                                                                                                     
tation and conservation at economically efficient levels over the short and long runs.  See J.
Baird Callicott & Karen Mumford, Ecological Sustainability as a Conservation Concept, 11
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 32, 34 (1997)(identifying “resourcism” as one of the philosophies of
environmental policy that dominated the first three quarters of the twentieth century).  One of
the leading advocates of an extreme version of this utilitarian, anthropocentric approach was
the late economist Julian Simon, who contended that technological advances, spurred by the
profit motive, would prevent rising consumption from depleting and destroying natural re-
sources.  See, e.g., Julian L. Simon, Resources, Population, Environment: An Oversupply of
False Bad News, 208 SCI. 1431 (1980).  For more current versions of the policy, see, for exam-
ple, TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991);
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
11. Deep Ecology represents the most transformative-minded brand of environmental
policy, highly biocentric in orientation and deeply committed to the singular goal of environ-
mental preservation.  Its defining work is JAMES LOVELOCK, THE AGES OF GAIA: A BI-
OGRAPHY OF OUR LIVING EARTH (1988); Bill Devall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 299 (1980).  Speer’s and Stisser’s demographic frameworks, see supra note 9,
characterize Deep Ecology believers as among the “True Blue Greens” who eat, breathe, and
drink environmental preservation.  They are personified today at the extreme perhaps best by
Julia “Butterfly” Hill, who has lived more than one year 180-feet high in a 1000-year old red-
wood tree which she has named Luna, in order to prevent the tree from being felled for lumber.
See, e.g., James Brooke, Redwoods Still Inspire Sturdiest of Defenders, NEW YORK TIMES,
March 28, 1998 at A6; Lunatree, Luna, (visited Dec. 12, 1998) <http://www.lunatree.org>.
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ment will eventually win a dominant position through strategies of
competition and open conflict directed at more narrowly-constructed
policies such as environmental justice.  Along the way, of course, sus-
tainable development will have adopted many key items in the envi-
ronmental justice agenda—i.e., the cooperation strategy of successful
adaptation—but those components will appear as part of the sustain-
able development lexicon and toolbox, not as environmental justice
policies.
I. CO-EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS
The rapidly developing discipline of complexity theory—the
field of research focusing on dynamic systems that are complex,
adaptive, and evolutionary—offers many new insights into how such
systems co-evolve.  Two key co-evolutionary design properties of
such systems are (1) their focus on multi-trait optimization goals
rather than single-trait maximization goals and (2) the mix of coop-
eration, competition, and conflict they adopt in their adaptive, evolu-
tionary decision-making strategies.  These properties define how
complex adaptive systems, including legal systems, will seek to main-
tain fitness in their environments, and how successful they will be at
doing so.12
12. For an extended and more technical discussion of these properties, and how they may
be useful in the study of evolution of legal systems, see Ruhl, supra note 6, at 1437-67.  For
similar treatments of law using complexity theory or related concepts, see generally Hope M.
Babcock, Democracy’s Discontent in a Complex World: Can Avalanches, Sandpiles, and
Finches Optimize Michael Sandel’s Civic Republican Community?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2085 (1997)
(critiquing civic republican political theory using complex systems principles); Vincent Di Lo-
renzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures: Lending Discrimination Laws as a Test Case, 12
J. L. & POL. 637 (1996) (using chaos theory to evaluate the legislative response to alleged
lending discrimination); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of
Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 65 TENN. L. REV. 925
(1998) (discussing complexity theory in the concept of corporate structure, management, and
law).  See also Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 425, 432-35 (1994) (developing a model for legislative decision making based on
chaos theory); Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex
Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 192
(1996) (applying to ecological protection issues); Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence:
Chaos, Brain Science, Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 934-35 (1994)
(discussing the potential significance of chaos and emergence to legal theory); Andrew W.
Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and Law, 60 UMKC L. REV. 751, 764-73 (1992) (containing a
general discussion of chaos theory and its application to judicial decision making); Jeff L. Le-
win, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About “Reasonable Medical Certainty”, 57
MD. L. REV. 380, 389-94 (1998) (describing the evolution of the tort doctrine of “reasonable
medical certainty” using complex systems principles); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in
Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-65 (1996) (describing legal evolution ac-
cording to path dependence theory and chaotic systems theory); Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory
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A. Multi-Trait Optimization vs. Single-Trait Maximization
One of the core elements of complexity theory is the description
of the design difficulties that exist in systems, given that they are
composed of a diversity of “traits” exhibiting a correspondingly com-
plex diversity of relationships.  Improving the performance of any
one trait to approach its maximal performance capacities can have
disastrous effects on other traits in the system and thus on the system
as a whole.  Complexity theory research suggests that within any
complex adaptive system “conflicting constraints” exist between dif-
ferent possible combinations of components’ structural traits.13  These
constraints limit the degree to which any one trait can be “improved”
without causing failure or degradation of another trait.  The system
must take all other traits into consideration when evaluating the ef-
                                                                                                                                     
and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329, 329-31 (1993) (applying chaos theory to
the legal dilemma between “present justice” and “future justice”); Kenton K. Yee, Coevolution
of Law and Culture: A Coevolutionary Games Approach, COMPLEXITY, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 4
(describing attempts to mathematically model evolution of common law according to complex
adaptive systems dynamics).
Several other works discuss complexity theory or its branches, in specific legal settings, al-
beit sometimes very briefly.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory
Disclosure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843, 854-59 (1994) (applying chaos
theory to capital market regulation); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Cha-
otic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 546, 581-92 (1994) (discussing the application of chaos theory to capital market regula-
tion); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decision Making and The-
ory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 114-15 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court constitutional juris-
prudence using, among other mediums, a discussion of chaos theory); Alistair M. Hanna, The
Land Use System, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 531, 538 (1996) (discussing application of chaos
theory and self-organization theory to a land use regulation system); Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1641-42 (1995) (discussing the anti-parasitic
effect of evolutionary processes as an analogy to democratic processes); Glenn Harlan Rey-
nolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 112-15 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court
constitutional jurisprudence using chaos theory); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environ-
mental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’ Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 46-48 (1993) (discussing chaos theory surfacing in evolutionary biology
commentary as a metaphor for evolution of environmental law); see also MICHEL VAN DE
KERCHOVE & FRANCOIS OST, LEGAL SYSTEM BETWEEN ORDER AND DISORDER 102-77 (Iain
Stewart trans., Oxford University Press 1994) (discussing order-disorder tensions in legal sys-
tems); Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of
Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 452-54, 476 (1997)
(focusing on mathematically complex issues as they arise in law, such as cyclical priority issues
in liens and property titles); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 479, 480-82 (1997) (advocating an empiricist “systems approach” to legal analysis).  See
generally Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (using computational theories to examine
norm competition).
13. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 5, at 169-73 (using a model of a genomic network to show
that the more interconnected genes are, the more likely it is that conflicting constraints will ex-
ist).
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fects of changing one trait on the overall fitness of the system.
Thus, we can envision a landscape of varying fitness level poten-
tials for the system in a given environment with peaks, valleys, and
plains of the landscape representing the fitness potential of different
combinations of system traits.14  Indeed, we can construct such a fit-
ness landscape for any system of connected interactions.  The pres-
ence of such conflicting constraints may make the landscape flat with
few high spots, or rugged and multipeaked.15  Much of complex sys-
tems research is aimed at defining systems’ fitness landscapes and
understanding how they evolve across them.16  Each system’s objec-
tive is to maintain optimum levels of fitness over the long run, even if
that means avoiding maximization of single-trait fitness opportunities
in favor of maintaining above average long-term performance for the
system as a whole.
Legal systems can be characterized according to their choice of a
single-trait maximization versus a multi-trait optimization approach.
For example, the inter-branch checks and balances and federalist
structure of the Constitution suggest a multi-trait, long-term optimi-
zation framework, whereas the formation of highly specialized and
centralized federal administrative agencies in the latter part of this
century can be viewed as a proliferation of single-trait maximization
systems.17  Within the body of environmental law, examples abound
of single-trait maximization laws that so elevate a primary goal above
all others, such as protection of endangered species, they experience
difficulty managing other traits that necessarily are part of the sys-
tem, such as private property rights.18  We must stay aware of the con-
sequences of designing laws that attempt to maximize the perform-
ance of a particular social or legal attribute, thereby sacrificing the
performance of other social and legal goals.
14. See id. at 26 (relating that biologists envision “fitness landscapes, where the peaks rep-
resent high fitness, and populations wander . . . across the landscape seeking peaks, but perhaps
never achieving them”).
15. In the field of evolutionary biology, for example, Kauffman states that:
[a]daptation is usually thought of as a process of “hill climbing” through minor varia-
tions toward “peaks” of high fitness on a fitness landscape. And natural selection is
thought of as “pulling” an adapting population towards such peaks. We can imagine a
mountain range on which populations of organisms . . . are feeling their way to the
summits.
Id. at 154.
16. Complex systems researchers view evolution in any system as “an attempt to solve a
complex optimization problem.”  COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 5, at 118.
17. See Ruhl, supra note 6, at 1467-74.
18. See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 968-79.
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B. Strategies of Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict
The fitness landscape model used in complexity theory offers
some insights into co-evolutionary environments, such as that of
evolving biological systems.  As one system (e.g., a species) evolves
across its fitness landscape, it necessarily changes the fitness land-
scapes of other systems with which it interacts and prompts them to
make evolutionary moves as well.19  Thus the fitness landscape model,
because of the static image a landscape implies, does not present the
whole picture.20  As one system travels across its seemingly static fit-
ness landscape, its travels necessarily alter the fitness landscapes of
other systems; in turn, changes in those systems alter the fitness land-
scape of the former system.  In other words, there is a feedback rela-
tionship, or coupling property, between all co-evolving systems.  Fit-
ness landscapes of various coupled systems are linked by their
temporal feedback interactions and require that all linked systems
reconstruct their evolutionary strategies continually—a sort of per-
petual exercise in game theory.21
Systems cope with their couplings to other systems’ evolutions
through strategies of cooperation, competition, and conflict.  The
“survival of the fittest” popularization of evolutionary biology makes
us think first of competition between species that is “predicated upon
collective demand for a common resource when the available supply
is inadequate for all of the organisms.”22  Competition may take the
form of active conflict, but it does not necessarily require that two
19. Hence the problem for adaptive systems is that, while the process of adaptation inher-
ent in the “survival of the fittest” conception of evolution is designed to lead to ever-increasing
improvements, all other systems competing for the same scarce resources are adapting.  Find-
ing the optimal condition thus requires strategies designed to take into account competing sys-
tems’ anticipated adaptations.  KAUFFMAN, supra note 5, at 119-26, 247-59.
20. As Kauffman explains:
[t]he idealization we have used [thus far] that fitness landscapes are fixed and un-
changing is false.  Fitness landscapes change because the environment changes.  And
the fitness landscape of one species changes because the other species that form its
niche themselves adapt on their own fitness landscapes.  Bat and frog, predator and
prey, coevolve.  Each adaptive move by the bats deforms the landscape of the frogs.
Id. at 208.
21. See id. at 217-21.  Kauffman notes that in a single game of the famous “Prisoners Di-
lemma,” the rational strategy of the two independent agents is defect-defect, but that in a re-
peated game different strategies emerge as the independent agents come to understand the co-
ordinated nature of their choices.  This effect, posits Kauffman, provides an analogy to the
coevolution of fitness landscapes, though coevolution in biological organisms takes place with-
out conscious predecision.  See id.
22. Robert McIntosh, Competition: Historical Perspectives, in KEYWORDS OF EVO-
LUTIONARY BIOLOGY 67 (Evelyn Fox Keller & Elisabeth A. Lloyd eds., 1992).
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species combat over the same morsel of food.23  On the other hand,
systems on a collision course need not always resort to either open
conflict or passive competition, as tacit or explicit compromises may
assure two systems’ mutual survival instead of each risking its own
demise in all-out warfare.24  Thus, systems locked in co-evolutionary
relations adopt shifting blends of cooperation, competition, and con-
flict to maintain fitness in a constantly changing evolutionary envi-
ronment.25
Legal systems also experience co-evolutionary effects with other
social, economic, and legal systems.  For example, modern environ-
mental law made great strides through so-called “command-and-
control” approaches when direct intervention in free-wheeling re-
sourcist policies proved highly effective in altering social and eco-
nomic behaviors considered damaging to the environment.26  In the
long run, however, that approach ossified into a static set of rules
23. See JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF EVOLUTION IN OUR
TIME 142 (1995) (“Even if [two species] never actually jostle and joust, never once collide
physically over a . . . seed or a nesting site . . . , natural selection will gradually magnify their
differences.”).
24. For example, through ecological displacement—species yielding part of an environ-
ment to competitors—more species can be accommodated, the overall diversity of the envi-
ronment rises, and as a result all cooperating species may prosper more than under an active
conflict or passive competition regime.  See generally Evelyn Strauss, Mutual Nonaggression
Pact May Aid Ant Spread, 282 SCI. 854 (1998) (describing the discovery of a species of ant
whose colonies cooperate in order to maximize their respective fitness over other competing
species of ants).
The preeminent biologist Edward O. Wilson explains that an ecological “community shifts
continuously, and by an unconscious trial and error, through innumerable fits and starts, its
biodiversity slowly rises.  Species excluded earlier at last find room, symbiotic pairs and trios
are fitted together, the forest grows deeper and richer, new niches are prepared.  The commu-
nity thus approaches a mature state, actually a dynamic equilibrium with species forever arriv-
ing and disappearing and the total species numbers bobbing up and down inside narrow limits.”
EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 172-73 (1992).  Wilson’s model of ecosystems is
precisely the complexity theory model of a dynamical system’s co-evolutionary transition to-
wards the region of complexity.  For example, Kauffman explores the issue of “community as-
sembly” as one of co-evolution of fitness landscapes which produces a “‘community landscape’,
in which each point of the terrain represents a different combination of species [and] . . . the
peaks will represent points of high fitness—combinations that are stable.”  KAUFFMAN, supra
note 5, at 211-14.
25. Gell-Mann posits that “[a]lthough competition among schemata is a characteristic of
complex adaptive systems, the systems themselves may indulge in a mixture of competition and
cooperation in their interactions with one another.  It is often beneficial for complex adaptive
systems to join together to form a collective entity that also functions as a complex adaptive
system … .”  GELL-MANN, supra note 5, at 242.  Ecosystems are an example, see WEINER, su-
pra note 23, at 200-02, and another might be “when individuals and firms in an economy oper-
ate under a government that regulates their behavior in order to promote values important to
the community as a whole.”  GELL-MANN, supra note 5, at 242.
26. See Ruhl, supra note 6, at 1456-62.
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administered by entrenched federal bureaucracies allowing economic
and social interests to evolve around environmental law to the point
at which today we find ourselves confronted with problems of the en-
vironment that appear intractable to the system that once seemed so
powerful.27  Hence, in order to engage environmental law in that co-
evolutionary process, we must design itas we must any body of
lawas a complex adaptive system.28
II. STUDIES IN CO-EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
Categorizing and grouping environmental policy approaches as I
haveresourcism, mainstream environmentalism, and Deep Ecol-
ogy; sustainable development and environmental justiceoverstates
the degree to which they comprise discrete and mutually exclusive
“camps” of ideology.  All of these approaches share the common trait
of attempting to define how humans should behave toward the envi-
ronment.  Each offers a problem-solving strategy and a design for
implementing it.  The reason we think of them as different is because
their strategies and designs for dealing with human behavior and the
environment are different.  But what are their strategies and designs
for dealing with each other?  How do they co-evolve?
Complexity theory tells us that these approaches can be catego-
rized not only by how they differ in terms of policy toward the envi-
ronment—e.g., biocentric versus anthropocentric; strong regulation
versus free market—but also how they are constructed as adaptive
systems.  For example, Deep Ecology is single-minded in focus and
strives to maximize immediate positions primarily through conflict.
Deep Ecology advocates want it all, now.  For them, anything less
than total victory is total failure, hence they have devised strategies
and designs focused on winning battles.  By contrast, resourcism and
mainstream environmentalism are more “one step at a time” in ap-
proach, in that they are designed to achieve long-term gains at rela-
tively modest optimizing increments gained through a blend of coop-
eration, competition, and, where necessary, conflict.  Co-evolution is
what happens when many such varied approaches collide in coopera-
tion, competition, and conflict.
The particular focus here is the co-evolution of the single-trait
maximizing strategy found in environmental justice and the multi-
trait optimizing strategy found in sustainable development.  Al-
27. See id. at 1463-67.
28. See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 980-91.
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though it is dangerous to assume history will repeat itself, a recent
precedent shows how two closely associated but contrasting envi-
ronmental policies have co-evolved.  For Deep Ecology, a single-trait
maximizing strategy if ever there was one, and the multi-trait optimi-
zation approach of mainstream environmentalism emerged together
in the 1970s and have remained coupled ever since.  To demonstrate
how they co-evolved, I use a case study based on the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA).29  I then suggest that the same themes
found in that story are playing out today in the co-evolution of envi-
ronmental justice and sustainable development.
A. The Endangered Species Act and the Rise and Fall of Deep
Ecology at the Hands of Mainstream Environmentalism
Amidst the flurry of federal environmental law enactments in
the 1970s, considered by many as the dawn of modern American en-
vironmental law,30 Deep Ecology arrived on the scene with a bang in
the form of the Endangered Species Act.  This extraordinary law
“elevates the goal of conservation of … species above virtually all
other considerations,”31 a feature that, in 1973, made the ESA “the
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation.”32  Although the other laws en-
acted during the same time period clearly were meant to change the
29. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994) (the Endangered Species Act).  The case
study is by no means intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the law, policy, and
practice under the ESA.  For that background see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE ROWLAND,
THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 193-276 (3d ed. 1997); RICHARD LITTELL,
ENDANGERED AND OTHER PROTECTED SPECIES: FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION  3-108
(1992); DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS
AND IMPLEMENTATION (1989).
30. Described as the “explosion of environmental law,” from 1970 through 1976 in quick
order Congress newly enacted or substantially amended ten major environmental regulation
statutes covering air, water, and land pollution, project planning, workplace safety, manufac-
turing, species protection, and public drinking water.  See J. William Futrell, The History of
Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM
RESOURCES TO RECOVERY § 1.2(I)(1)-(3), at 35-37 (1993) (collecting statutes); ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW SCIENCE, AND POLICY 106-110 (2d
ed. 1996) (collecting statutes).  That pace of new enactments was nearly duplicated during the
same period in the field of natural resources protection.  See Futrell, supra, § 1.2(I)(3), at 38-39
(collecting statutes).  The process continued into the 1980s, albeit at a slower pace.  See
PERCIVAL, supra, at 111-12 (collecting statutes).  Some laws were changed more than once in
this period, each change boosting the degree of federal dominance.  See John P. Dwyer, The
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1183-85 (1995) (tracing
changes to federal air pollution control legislation).
31. ROHLF, supra note 29, at 25.
32. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
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playing field in terms of the role markets and property rights play in
resource use decisions, these other laws contained numerous conces-
sions to the cost-benefit approach of resourcism.33  The ESA, by con-
trast, was single-minded in focus and unyielding in effect, earning it a
reputation as the “pit bull of environmental law.” 34  With only nar-
row exceptions, the ESA’s prohibition of a “take”35 of protected spe-
cies applied everywhere and to everyone subject to United States ju-
risdiction.36  In demanding terms, the ESA prevented federal agencies
from causing or authorizing the extinction of species.37  The ESA was
closer to zero tolerance than any other major environmental law.38  It
was not about compromise, or incremental gains—it was about
maximizing the goal of species conservation above all else.
The dichotomy between the ESA and most of the rest of the
federal enactments was made plain by the event that marks the ab-
solute high point of Deep Ecology in environmental law: the Su-
preme Court decision in Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill.39
In that case, the Court halted the construction of a nearly complete
federally-financed dam project because the federal agencies involved
had not complied with the ESA.40  When asked to refuse to enjoin the
33. For example, the promulgation of effluent discharge limitations under the Clean Wa-
ter Act involved a complex series of cost-benefit analyses with increasingly more stringent out-
comes phased in over time.  See generally  33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994) (Clean Water Act).
See, e.g., E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Jonathan K. Baum,
Legislating Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Experience, 9
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 75 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, ENVTL. F., Sep.-Oct. 1998, at
55.
35. “Take” is defined as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
36. See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).  For an overview of the take prohibition as implemented, see,
for example, Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private Land-
owners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419 (1994); Frederico Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition
Against Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live With A
Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109 (1991).
37. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).  For an overview of the scope of federal agency du-
ties with respect to species protected under the ESA, see BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 29, at
235-65; LITTELL, supra note 29, at 47-63.
38. Because of this quality, “the act just didn’t look like other legislation.”  CHARLES C.
MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH’S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 161
(1995) (emphasis in original).  Although Congress may not have been aware of the ramifica-
tions of the ESA’s different look, congressional staffers and others close to the drafting and
enactment of the original version of the ESA have suggested that they both understood and
intended the different look to carry the ESA where other laws enacted in the same time period
had not ventured.  See id. at 156-62.
39. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
40. For a thorough history of the project and its fate under the ESA, including how Con-
174 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:161
construction as a matter of equity and common sense, the Court
found that the ESA “admits of no exception”41 and “indicates beyond
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the
highest of priorities.”42  The Court refused to “make such fine utili-
tarian calculations” given that “Congress viewed the value of endan-
gered species as ‘incalculable.’”43  Resourcism was dead; long live
Deep Ecology.44  But not for very long.
Until TVA v. Hill, Deep Ecology and mainstream environmen-
talism went largely hand in hand, cooperating to forge an alliance
against resourcism and a new approach toward the environment.  But
TVA v. Hill made it clear that Deep Ecology was fundamentally not
the same as mainstream environmentalism.  Mainstream environ-
mentalism is not about protecting the environment above all else.
From its earliest days, mainstream environmentalism has accommo-
dated economic and social conditions that preclude instantly maxi-
mized outcomes on behalf of the environment.  For example, the
Clean Water Act, one of the ESA’s 1970s kin, still includes as a goal
“that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be elimi-
nated by 1985,”45 but nearly fifteen years after that deadline, there is
no serious plan or hope that it will ever be achieved.  Few people are
willing to live the way it would take to achieve that goal in any im-
mediate time frame.  Indeed, most mainstream environmentalists
would be horrified if required to live as Deep Ecologists would have
them live.46  But working one step at a time to address existing and
                                                                                                                                     
gress later authorized finalization of the dam by special legislation and amended the ESA to
create an exemption from the extinction prohibition, see MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 38, at
164-73.
41. 437 U.S. at 173.
42. Id. at 174.
43. Id. at 187.
44. The case has been described as a “ringing endorsement of the environmentalists’
proposition (and the basis of their empowerment strategy) that if citizens are able to prove a
statutory violation, the court must enforce the law without equitable balancing.”  ZYGMUNT
J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 681-
82 (2d ed. 1998).  Indeed, after TVA v. Hill the ESA assumed cultural significance beyond en-
vironmental issues, as the term “endangered species” became a rhetorical device used in a va-
riety of political and social settings when the speaker wished to emphasize the gravity of threats
to a particular icon (e.g., family values, affordable homes, baseball) and the need to save it “at
all costs.” See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Endangered Species Wannabees, 29 SETON HALL L.
REV. 235 (1998).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994).
46. Thus Speer and Stisser distinguish in their demographic breakdowns of attitudes be-
tween the “True Blue Greens”—those who truly practice Deep Ecology—and the much larger
group of “Greenback Greens” who espouse environmentalism and support it through mone-
tary contributions, but who live quite unlike True Blue Greens in terms of lifestyle commitment
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new water pollution problems is a core value of mainstream envi-
ronmentalism and a noble enough goal for most people to feel they
have earned the badge of environmentalist.
Competition between the ESA and other environmental laws
thus emerged in the 1980s, as the incrementalist approach of main-
stream environmentalism required constant refinement and attention
and thus demanded considerable legislative, administrative, and eco-
nomic resources.  Mainstream environmentalism could not offer sig-
nificant concessions to the ESA and the win-at-all-costs agenda of
Deep Ecology.  To be sure, mainstream environmentalism did not
openly contest Deep Ecology in this period; rather, the competition
was a passive battle for the scarce resources of legislative and judicial
power.  For example, while the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments of 198447 and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 198648 substantially boosted the potency of hazardous waste
management and remediation statutes enacted in the previous dec-
ade, the ESA made no great strides forward.  In fact, the ESA was
stripped of its “no tolerance” aura in 1982 when Congress added pro-
cedures for the approval of “incidental take” of protected species—
i.e., permits to kill endangered species.49  The ESA was beginning to
look like any other environmental law.50  Deep Ecology’s voice was
fading.
The 1990s have witnessed not merely passive competition, but
outright conflict between Deep Ecology and mainstream environ-
mental law, and Deep Ecology is losing.51  In stark contrast to its de-
                                                                                                                                     
to environmental preservation.  See generally Speer, supra note 9; Stisser, supra note 9.
47. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat.
3221 (1984).
48. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986).
49. See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 29, at 229-35; LITTELL, supra note 29, at 70-73.
50. One commentator has hypothesized that this amendment, on its face a setback for the
absolutist approach of the ESA, actually gave the ESA more influence in that landowners pre-
viously ignored the ESA take prohibition because there was no way to obtain a permit,
whereas after the amendment there was some framework for providing permit authority and
thus some incentive to work within the statute’s requirements.  See Michael J. Bean, The En-
dangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned from the Past Quarter Century,
28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,701, 10,708 (1998).  To the extent this is an accurate as-
sessment of landowner behavior, it suggests that the absolutist Deep Ecology approach may
backfire by producing failures in implementation and compliance.
51. For example, recently parties and attorneys associated with the TVA v. Hill case gath-
ered to recognize the twentieth anniversary of the decision, and to take stock of how the “little
fish bites big dam” quality of the case may have limited what the decision could have meant to
the Deep Ecology movement.  See Janet Byron, Snail darter saga still reverberates in Tennessee,
ENDANGERED SPECIES & WETLANDS REP., Dec. 1998, at 12, 12.
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cision in TVA v. Hill, for example, the Supreme Court has limited the
basis for Deep Ecology activists’ standing under the ESA,52 con-
strained the potency of the ESA’s take prohibition by stiffening its
burden of proof,53 and opened the door to standing for economic in-
terests injured by the application of the ESA’s species protections.54
Meanwhile, in Congress the ESA has become the whipping boy for a
broad-based backlash against Deep Ecology in general.55  In an effort
not to lose the ground they have gained elsewhere, mainstream envi-
ronmentalists openly endorse ESA reform designed to modernize the
ESA with property owner incentives and other compromise-oriented
tools.56  Although mainstream environmentalists draw the line at the
resurrection of resourcist measures which sacrifice species conserva-
tion goals, they will just as quickly draw the line at Deep Ecology’s
insistence for dramatically expanding the command-and-control leg-
acy of the ESA.57  Indeed, events have taken such a 180-degree turn
that some of the most vocal critics of the ESA—that is, of its present
manner of implementation—are the Deep Ecology believers.58
The co-evolution of Deep Ecology and mainstream environmen-
talism, as represented in the evolution of the ESA since 1973, has
thus passed through three phases: cooperation in the 1970s, competi-
tion in the 1980s, and conflict in the 1990s. The process has not been
as linear and steady as this oversimplified history of the ESA may
suggest, but the trend has been unmistakable.59  The lesson is that the
52. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
53. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct.
2407 (1995).
54. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
55. See Roger Platt, Ships Passing in the Night: Current Prospects for Reauthorization of
the Endangered Species Act, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 3, 5-6
(discussing the supporters and critics of the bipartisan Senate ESA reform bill).
56. For a summary of reform initiatives the Clinton Administration has adopted, for the
most part with enthusiastic endorsement from mainstream environmental organizations, see J.
B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress?  An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367 (1998); see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 44, at 699-709.
57. For a discussion of the officers of the Environmental Defense Fund advocating several
of the Clinton Administration’s ESA reform measures, see Michael J. Bean & David S. Wil-
cove, The Private Land Problem, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1 (1997); Michael J. Bean &
David S. Wilcove, Ending the Impasse, ENVTL. F., July-Aug. 1996, at 22.
58. For example, the major critics of the Clinton Administration’s ESA reform measures
have been Deep Ecology groups.  See Ruhl, supra note 56, at 386-87, 398.
59. See generally MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND (1995) (describing mainstream envi-
ronmentalism generally as having deteriorated into polite, ineffectual activism marked by alli-
ances with corporate philanthropists and government agencies, and calling for a new wave of
environmental activism which, by all appearances, would be a combination of Deep Ecology
and environmental justice).  Recently, pie-wielding activist members of the Biotic Baking Bri-
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broader, multi-trait optimization strategy of mainstream environmen-
talism dominated the co-evolution of the pair of policies.  Main-
stream environmentalism “cherry-picked” what worked from Deep
Ecology, and then it moved on.  When Deep Ecology thereafter
challenged the mainstream environmentalism agenda, the latter pre-
vailed because, rather than stake its entire environmental policy on
maximizing one trait, mainstream environmentalism stayed focused
on long-term optimization of fitness and used a blend of cooperation,
competition, and conflict strategies to succeed.
B. Tracing and Predicting the Co-Evolution of Sustainable
Development and Environmental Justice
As successful as mainstream environmentalism was at reshaping
American environmental policy, it has itself become subsumed into a
larger system: what is known today as sustainable development pol-
icy.60  Mainstream environmentalism retained sharp boundaries be-
tween environment and economy, and hardly recognized social eq-
uity as a player in the evolution of environmental policy.61  By
contrast, sustainable development, as the “next generation” of envi-
ronmental policy,62 fuses environment, economy, and equity into one
policy triad.63  Sustainable development necessarily must borrow
                                                                                                                                     
gade smeared Sierra Club president Carl Pope in the face with a pie, claiming he and the or-
ganization have turned against the ideals of the environmentalist movement.  See Cesar G. So-
viano, American Pie, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 1998, at 1D.
60. For a more extensive discussion of the replacement of mainstream environmentalism
with sustainable development as the dominant environmental policy, and of the multi-trait op-
timization focus of sustainable development in general, see J. B. Ruhl, Sustainable Develop-
ment: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L. REV. 31
(1999).
61. See FOREMAN, supra note 2, at 1 (“Although environmentalists as individuals often
sympathized with, and even actively supported, the political struggles of ethnic minorities (and
African Americans in particular), environmentalism and civil rights/social welfare evolved as
distinct issue spheres . . . .  Environmentalism, especially at the national level, had little racial
aspect as such.”); Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environ-
mental Laws and “Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 256-78 (1997) (describing in detail the
“tense history” between mainstream environmentalism and the civil rights/environmental jus-
tice movement).  Several mainstream environmentalist organizations have tried to rectify the
omission of social equity from their agenda.  See, e.g., EDF Launches New Environmental Jus-
tice Initiative, EDF LETTER, Jan. 1999, at 7.
62. See generally THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (exploring sustainable
development concepts in a variety of applications demonstrating how sustainable development
differs from traditional environmental law and policy).
63. See  John Dernbach et al., U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A Five-Year
Review, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,504, 10,507 (1997) (Sustainable development
“requires us to see that there is virtually no such thing as a purely economic, environmental, or
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from mainstream environmentalism, market economics theory, and
social equity causes such as environmental justice to assemble its
multi-dimensional policy agenda. However, sustainable development
can only thrive if it resists being captured and dominated by any one
of those three policy legs.  Therein lies the source of the co-
evolutionary coupling between sustainable development and envi-
ronmental justice.
1. Cooperation—The Story Until Now
Sustainable development and environmental justice emerged as
well-formed policy ideas at about the same time, in the early 1980s,64
and immediately forged a cooperative relationship.  Sustainable de-
velopment benefited from the intensity with which environmental
justice advocates focused on the equity leg of the policy triad. Envi-
ronmental justice benefited from the increasingly broad policy accep-
tance that sustainable development enjoyed across international and
national lines which legitimized the more narrow message of envi-
ronmental justice.  As the two policy ideas grew in the 1980s their
mutual cooperation assured that respective positions prospered in the
marketplace of environmental policy approaches.
Early compilations of the environmental justice agenda thus in-
cluded sweeping endorsement of policies that could be regarded as
consistent with sustainable development.  For example, the October
1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership
Summit produced the “Principles of Environmental Justice,”65 out-
lining a broad agenda of “political, economic, and cultural libera-
tion.”66  The principles proclaimed that environmental justice
“affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the in-
terdependence of all species,”67 as well as the “fundamental right to
political, economic, cultural and environmental self-determination of
                                                                                                                                     
social problem.”); Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sustainable Development: Integrating Econom-
ics, Ecology, and Law, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 261, 263 (1995) (“Integrating economic and
environmental concerns is the controlling policy objective of sustainable development.”)
64. See Pezzoli, supra note 1, at 549-55 (sustainable development); FOREMAN, supra note
2, at 10-33 (environmental justice); Kaswan, supra note 61, at 225-28 (environmental justice).
65. See First People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Principles of Environ-
mental Justice (adopted Oct. 27, 1991), reprinted in FOREMAN, supra note 2, at App. B.  See
also Cheryl A. Calloway & Karen L. Ferguson, The “Human Environment” Requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act: Implications for Environmental Justice, 1997 DET. C. L.
REV. 1147, 1151, 1182-84 .
66. Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 65 (preamble).
67. Id. (Principle 1).
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all peoples.”68  According to the Principles, “environmental justice
requires that we, as individuals, make personal and consumer choices
to consume as little of Mother Earth’s resources . . . as possible[,] and
to insure . . . the health of the natural world for present and future
generations.”69  Other influential environmental justice leaders of-
fered similarly broad formative statements of the movement’s agenda
that encompassed sustainability, in particular a brand of sustainabil-
ity focused at community levels.70 Nothing in the early rhetoric of the
environmental justice movement suggested anything but support for
sustainability policy.
Nothing illustrates sustainable development’s contribution to
this mutually beneficial, cooperative relationship better than the 1997
report of the President’s Council on Sustainable Development
(PCSD).71  The PCSD summarized its report with a 16-point “We Be-
lieve” statement that completely abandons the resourcism-
environmentalism dichotomy.72  Central to the statement was ringing
endorsement of the fusion of economy, environment, and equity into
a united policy triad.  For example, the PCSD prominently declared
that “[e]conomic growth, environmental protection, and social equity
are linked.”73  To drive the point home, the PCSD reiterated that
theme in several different points of the “We Believe” statement,74 as
68. Id. (Principle 5).
69. Id. (Principle 17).
70. See FOREMAN, supra note 2, at 12-13, 152 n.17.
71. The PCSD issued its report in February 1997. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS (1997)
[hereinafter SUSTAINABLE AMERICA].  President Clinton commissioned the PCSD by execu-
tive order on June 29, 1993, to “develop and recommend to the president a national sustainable
development action strategy that will foster economic viability.”  Exec. Order No. 12,852, 58
Fed. Reg. 35,841 (1993).  The PCSD has issued additional reports focusing on translating its
recommended policies into concrete measures, see PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, BUILDING ON CONSENSUS: A PROGRESS REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AMERICA
(1997), and has been authorized “to continue its work by continuing to forge consensus on pol-
icy, demonstrating implementation, getting the word out about sustainable development, and
evaluating progress.”  The Fifteenth Meeting of the President’s Council on Sustainable Devel-
opment in Tulsa, Oklahoma, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,283 (1997).  For further background and descrip-
tion of the PCSD’s work and its place in the emerging domestic sustainable development pol-
icy, see Lash, supra note 1, at 83-84 (PCSD co-chair); Dernbach et al., supra note 63, at 10,507-
08.
72. SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 71, at v-vi, pt.10.
73. Id. at vi, pt.10.
74. Id. at v, pt.2 (Sustainable development will help “lead to the mutually reinforcing goals
of economic growth, environmental protection, and social equity.”); v, pt.3 (Steady progress in
reducing social disparities “is essential to economic growth, environmental health, and social
justice.”); v, pt.5 (Economic growth is “essential for progress toward greater prosperity, equity,
and environmental quality.”); vi, pt.9 (Local communities must increase their roles “in deci-
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well as in the body of the report,75 and contended that the primary
lesson learned from the last 25 years of environmental policy is that
“[e]conomic, environmental, and social problems cannot be ad-
dressed in isolation.”76 The PCSD report thus demonstrates that sus-
tainable development policy in the United States treats economy, en-
vironment, and equity as three inseparable dimensions.
2. Competition—Signs of Tension Are Emerging
Ironically, sustainable development’s environment-economy-
equity policy triad is also the source of competition between sustain-
able development and environmental justice. In the sustainable de-
velopment framework, equity is co-equal with environment and
economy. In the environmental justice framework, equity is placed
above all else.  Sustainable development is a multi-trait, long-term
policy optimizer, whereas environmental justice is a single-trait,
short-term policy maximizer.  The resemblance between their rela-
tionship and the relationship of mainstream environmentalism and
Deep Ecology suggests that a similar dance of competition and con-
flict will eventually unfold.
The numerous ongoing efforts to develop sets of “indicators” of
sustainable development illustrate the multi-trait optimizing orienta-
tion of sustainable development.  For example, the U.S. Interagency
Working Group on Sustainable Development Indicators (SDI
Group), a multi-agency policy development group formed at the rec-
ommendation of the PCSD,77 recently issued what it calls an
“experimental” set of indicators of sustainable development which it
believes “reflects the multidisciplinary and intergenerational nature
                                                                                                                                     
sions about environment, equity, natural resources, and economic progress.”); and, vi, pt.16
(Citizens must be educated “to understand the interdependence of economic prosperity, envi-
ronmental quality, and social equity.”).
75. See, e.g., id. at 12 (first three goals of the PCSD’s work are to help secure health and
the environment, economic prosperity, and equity); id. at 25 (the essential components of sus-
tainable development are environmental health, economic prosperity, and social equity and
well-being).
76. Id. at 26.
77. In response to the PCSD report, the Clinton Administration established the SDI
Group, thus formalizing the work of a number of federal agencies who had been meeting in-
formally since early 1994 to discuss various approaches for developing a set of sustainable de-
velopment indicators.  The SDI group reports to the Council on Environmental Quality in the
Executive Office of the President and is supported through voluntary contributions of staff and
resources by participating federal agencies.  See U.S. Interagency Working Group on Sustain-
able Development Indicators, Sustainable Development in the United States, (visited Oct. 27,
1998)<http://198.183.146.250/CGIBIN/om_isapi.dll?clientID=6524461&infobase=sdir1297.nfo
&softpage=Browse_ Frame_Pg42>[hereinafter U.S. Interagency].
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of sustainable development.”78  The SDI Group divides the 40 indica-
tors it developed into three categories: economic, environmental, and
social.79  All of the indicators in each category are macroscopic in fo-
cus: births to single mothers, population below poverty levels, income
distribution, unemployment, and so on.  None of the SDI Group’s in-
dicators directly asks the question whether environmental justice is
present at acceptable levels.  There is no single indicator devoted
specifically to measuring environmental justice. Nowhere does the
SDI Group reject environmental justice as a policy, and nothing in its
set of indicators necessarily works contrary to environmental justice;
rather, environmental justice simply is not present as a discrete policy
goal.
By contrast, environmental justice increasingly defines itself ac-
cording to a far narrower set of indicators than does sustainable de-
velopment.  Little is heard from environmental justice advocates to-
day about the sweeping, all-inclusive agenda statements of the early
1990s.  Rather, environmental justice studies focus repeatedly on
multivariate statistical analyses of localized demographic indicators
involving race, income, exposure to toxics, and receipt of environ-
mental protection resources.80  Most current environmental justice
policy analyses identify demographic imbalances in environmental
quality and protection that operate on relatively small scales of study,
and as such are subject to almost endless debate over study method.81
For example, one of the recurring debates in environmental justice
dialogue is whether zip code or census tracts provide the better study
unit for environmental justice measurements.82  And the already nar-
78. Id.  For other collections of and links to sustainable development indicators, see U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Community Based Environmental Protection, CBEP Home
Page (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/ecosystems/osecbak/>; Redefining Progress,
National Indicators Project (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://www.rprogress.org/progsum/
nip/nip_main.html>.
79. See U.S. Interagency, supra note 77, at  Table 4.2.
80. One leading environmental justice advocate has explained that “for the vast majority
of the groups in the Movement, the local fight is everything.”  FOREMAN, supra note 2, at 4
(quoting Lois Gibbs, Director, Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste).
81. For recent examples see Nancy Brooks & Rajiv Sethi, The Distribution of Pollution:
Community Characteristics and Exposure to Air Toxics, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 233
(1997), for a discussion of a zip code level cross-sectional correlation of air toxic emission loca-
tion and race; Richard D. Gragg III et al., The Location and Community Demographics of Tar-
geted Environmental Hazardous Sites in Florida, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1996), for a
discussion of a demographic proximity study of hazardous facilities to minority and low income
communities.
82. See Colin Crawford, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice: A Suggestion for
Professor Been, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 103 (1996).  There remains tremendous contro-
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row demographic approach increasingly has become more micro-
scopic in focus.  For example, EPA has adopted a site-specific demo-
graphic statistics approach for its use in determining whether individ-
ual state or local environmental permit decisions have
disproportionate impacts on racial minority populations.83 The focus
of environmental justice thus is increasingly on site-specific analyses
of a narrow set of demographic indicators, with race as the over-
arching theme of study and description.84
Thus it is apparent that none of the indicators being forged for
sustainable development has anything meaningful to say about envi-
ronmental justice as environmental justice advocates define it, and
that none of the indicators being forged for environmental justice has
anything meaningful to say about sustainable development as sus-
tainable development advocates define it.  There is no measure in the
SDI Group’s work that bears resemblance to the site-specific, race-
based demographic indicators environmental justice advocates use,
and hence we will not know if environmental justice improves as sus-
tainable development indicators show progress in sustainable devel-
opment.  On the other hand, when environmental justice is not
maximized demographically in a given location, environmental jus-
tice policy advocates offer no clue as to whether that condition is ac-
ceptable given non-equity considerations associated with environ-
ment and economy.  We cannot tell from their indicators when, if
ever, some environmental racial inequity is not unjust because sus-
tainability of environment or economy requires or justifies it.  The
two policies, at one time cooperating to gain momentum and legiti-
macy, appear to have parted ways in terms of how they present them-
selves to the outside world.
3. Conflict—The Writing Is On the Wall
Notwithstanding their divergence on the issue of indicators for
environmental policy, sustainable development advocates and envi-
ronmental justice advocates rarely have criticized each other.  The
competition between the two policy approaches thus far has been
largely passive.  But skirmishes between the two recently have sur-
                                                                                                                                     
versy over the merits of the demographic methods of many environmental justice studies.  See
FOREMAN, supra note 2, at 21-27.
83. See SAB Recommends Steps for EPA to Follow in Analyses of “Disproportionate Im-
pacts”, 209 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) A-3 (1998); SAB to Begin Reviewing Methods for Deter-
mining ‘Disproportionate Impact’, 171 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) AA-1 (1998).
84. See FOREMAN, supra note 2, at 121(“many movement partisans unhesitatingly assign
race a dominant causal role leading to unfair outcomes.”)
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faced in unexpected contexts, suggesting that more and larger battles
may be in their future.
For example, when EPA recently proposed a set of guidelines
for investigating claims that state and local environmental permitting
decisions violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Laws,85 its biggest critics
were not from industry, but rather from state and local environ-
mental agencies complaining of the narrow focus and burdensome
requirements of what amounts to a core environmental justice goal.86
EPA’s guidelines, and their application in one alleged case of dispro-
portionate impact regarding a proposed facility in Michigan, led to
the first case of outright war between EPA’s environmental justice
agenda and a state environmental agency.  Environmental justice ad-
vocates used EPA’s Title VI rules to challenge the state’s issuance of
an air pollution permit to a proposed steel mill, a permit that the
state contended complied with all EPA air pollution rules and appro-
priately balanced environment, economy, and equity.87  After a high-
profile proceeding in which the state essentially put EPA’s environ-
mental justice program on trial, the state won.88  EPA is now in the
85. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging
Permits (visited Oct. 26, 1998) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/oej/titlevi.html>(explaining how EPA
will investigate claims that issuance by states of environmental pollution permits violates envi-
ronmental justice goals).
86. See John Pendergrass, EPA Discrimination Guidance Dispute, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct.,
1998, at 6; States Negative on Interim Guidance, 29 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 232, 232 (1998); Com-
ments on Title VI Guidance Seek Clearer Definitions, Input from More Parties, 29 Env’t Rep.
(BNA) 234, 235 (1998).  To be sure, there is no shortage of concern being expressed from in-
dustry either.  See, e.g., David Warner & James Worsham, The EPA’s New Reach, NATION’S
BUSINESS, Oct. 1998, at 12.
87. The matter involved a complaint filed with EPA alleging that the Michigan Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality violated Title VI in issuing a Clean Air Act permit to Select
Steel Corporation of America for construction of a $175 million steel recycling mill in Flint,
Michigan.  See Michigan Governor Blames EPA Policy for Company Decision to Scrap Factory
Plan, 172 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) AA-1 (1998); Michigan DEQ Chief Says EPA Narrowing
Issues Considered in Title VI Complaints, 225 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) A-1 (1998).
88. On October 30, 1998, the EPA Office of Civil Rights issued a letter of decision dis-
missing the complaint, primarily because the evidence demonstrated that the facility would not
cause violations of health-based ambient air quality standards and technology-based emission
limits enforced under the Clean Air Act.  See EPA File No. 5R-98-R5 (visited Feb. 23, 1999)
<http://www.epa.gov/region5/steelcvr.htm>.  See also EPA Panel Upholds Flint Steel Mill Per-
mit; Michigan Seeks Dismissal of Complaint, 29 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1119, 1119 (1998); EPA
Dismisses Complaint on Proposed Steel Plant in Michigan, 29 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1351, 1351
(1998); EPA Dismisses Michigan Complaint; State Officials Still Wary of New Policy, 211 Daily
Env’t Rep. (BNA) AA-1 (1998). A collection of environmental and public interest groups peti-
tioned EPA to reopen the complaint, alleging that it was politically motivated and presents a
dangerous precedent for EPA’s Title VI policy.  See Paul Connolly, Groups Say EPA Must Re-
consider Dismissal of Michigan Civil Rights Act Complaint, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Mar. 2,
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process of revising the proposed Title VI guidelines, presumably to
address the criticisms lodged by state and local officials among oth-
ers.89
The Michigan steel mill case is unlikely to remain the sole exam-
ple for long.90  The potential for conflict between sustainable devel-
opment and environmental justice increases as the latter demands
site-specific outcomes that do not comport with the local, regional,
and national goals of sustainable development.  As environmental
justice becomes more intransigent in its strategy, as is likely in the
face of a strengthening sustainable development movement, it will
lead to increasing numbers of clashes between the two.91  Gradually,
what were once mutually compatible policy approaches will grow dis-
tant, and it is unlikely that sustainable development advocates have
an unlimited supply of cooperation strategies available for dealing
with environmental justice’s intractable demands.  Conflict is inevita-
ble. Although environmental justice may win some battles along the
way, if it wages all out war against sustainable development, it is un-
likely to win in the long run.92
CONCLUSION
Sustainable development and environmental justice are locked
in a co-evolutionary relationship, coupled by their mutual focus on
                                                                                                                                     
1999, at A-5.  As of this writing EPA had not ruled on the petition.
89. See Environmental Justice: Draft Revision of Guidance for Processing Rights Com-
plaints Expected by Mid-1999, 29 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1807 (1999).  An advisory panel EPA cre-
ated to assist in the revisions was unable to reach consensus recommendations and instead will
be delivering to EPA a report detailing the members’ divergent views about the issue.  See
Cheryl Hogue, Title VI Advisory Panel Report Sets Out Issues, Gives No Recommendation,
Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Mar. 2, 1999, at A-7.
90. A similar claim recently was filed against the Texas Natural Resources Conservation
Commission, alleging the agency has engaged in Clean Air Act permit and enforcement deci-
sions having racially unjust impacts.  See Two Environmental Groups File Civil Rights Com-
plaint Against TNRCC Over Air Permits, 243 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) A-7 (1998).
91. Foreman predicts that “[i]f pursued aggressively, environmental justice may exacer-
bate aspects of environmental policymaking that have been widely bemoaned (such as eco-
nomic inefficiency, muddled policy priorities, the gap between expert and public perceptions of
risk, and local inflexibility on siting issues).”  FOREMAN, supra note 2, at 3.  It is precisely those
aspects of mainstream environmentalism that sustainable development advocates hope to rid
from environmental policymaking; hence, to the extent environmental justice stands in their
way, the two may come to blows.
92. This is particularly likely as environmental policy attention focuses increasingly on
regional and global issues such as acid rain, global warming, and fisheries depletion.  Environ-
mental justice as a “movement is too weak, has too few resources, and has too strong a local
orientation to be a significant separate presence on such national and international matters.”
Id. at 122.
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social equity.  However, they are not entirely compatible in that fo-
cus.  Sustainable development includes equity as a co-equal partner
in the policy triad of environment, economy, and equity, concerning
itself with optimizing the balance of those three goals over time
across large and small geographic scales.  Environmental justice uses
equity as the theme for a narrow, single-minded focus on eliminating
disproportionate impacts of environmental degradation on racial mi-
norities at site-specific levels.  While there is room for cooperation
between those two systems of environmental policy, there is also the
likelihood of competition and conflict.
If the history of mainstream environmentalism and Deep Ecol-
ogy is any indication, and it may not be, over time sustainable devel-
opment and environmental justice will find less in common.  But they
will always be coupled in a co-evolutionary dance.  The bottom line
for sustainable development is that, while it will become the domi-
nant force in national and international environmental policy, it will
always have to deal with the narrow, locally-entrenched form of envi-
ronmental justice.  The bottom line for environmental justice is that
so long as it contends that racially disproportionate local impact is
never acceptable regardless of economic and environmental sustain-
ability indicators, it will play an opposition role in the environmental
policy of the future. If environmental justice advocates want more
than that, they are likely to be as disappointed and marginalized as
today’s Deep Ecology devotees; however, if they are content with
having a seat at the table of sustainable development, though with no
power of veto, they will continue to have a meaningful role in the co-
evolutionary play of environmental policy.
This prediction of the co-evolution of sustainable development
and environmental justice is not meant to discourage or discredit the
environmental justice policy movement.  Environmental justice un-
doubtedly will shape sustainable development.  It already has.  But
the writing is on the wall: as a complex adaptive system driven by the
goal of multi-trait optimization, sustainable development will relate
to environmental justice through strategies of cooperation, competi-
tion, and conflict.  The unknown for now is what the mix of those
strategies will be.
